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This symposium asks an important question. Is secularism a 
non-negotiable aspect of liberal constitutionalism? The likelihood is 
that secularism is a nearly insurmountable requirement of liberal 
constitutionalism, but it is at least theoretically possible to have a 
system that promotes both liberal constitutionalism and religion. 
There are, however, some strong lessons from history that 
demonstrate that more often than not, secular constitutions are the 
best route to protect individual autonomy as well as religion. This 
Article will focus on the important lessons we can learn about this 
issue from Japan and Japanese history. 
Japan’s first experiment with modern constitutionalism was the 
Meiji Constitution, which led to the primacy of State Shinto, while 
including provisions that appeared, on their face, to protect personal 
and religious freedom.1 As will be seen, it was an abject failure in the 
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1. DAI NIHON TEIKOKU K(13ƿ[MEIJI CONSTITUTION] (Japan). An English 
translation is available at http://www.ndl.go.jp/constitution/e/etc/c02.html. See also 
Kiyomi Morioka, 7KH (YROXWLRQ RI 6WDWH 6KLQWǀ, in A HISTORY OF JAPANESE 
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latter realm.2 In contrast, the modern Japanese constitution, which is 
grounded in a secular approach, has been far more successful than 
the Meiji Constitution in protecting personal autonomy and religious 
freedom.3 The Japanese example, at least, supports the argument that 
in most contexts secularism is helpful in promoting liberal 
constitutionalism even if it is not an insurmountable predicate. 
Moreover, the Japanese example teaches us that secular 
constitutionalism may also be a better means to protect broad 
religious freedom than non-secular approaches, at least for those who 
are not part of the dominant majority religion in a given system.
I. THE MEIJI CONSTITUTION, STATE SHINTO, AND THE ILLUSION OF 
RELIGIOUS FREEDOM
The Meiji Constitution was promulgated on February 11, 
1889.4 It borrowed heavily from European constitutions of the era 
and, on its face, reflected some of the ideals of liberal 
constitutionalism.5 It created a set of rights for citizens that were, in 
theory, progressive for that era.6 These included bestowing the right 
to elect members of the lower house in the Japanese Parliament (the 
Diet) to some citizens,7 the right to own property,8 the right to 
change residence freely,9 the right to be free from government 
entrance or search of one’s home,10 the right to trial in criminal 
RELIGION 525, 528 (Kazuo Kasahara ed., Paul McCarthy & Gaynor Sekimori trans., 
 GLVFXVVLQJ WKH SULPDF\ RI 6WDWH 6KLQWǀ GXULQJ WKH0HLML (UDNOBUSHIGE 
HOZUMI, ANCESTOR-WORSHIP AND JAPANESE LAW 47 (2d & rev. ed. 1912) (same).
2. See infra Parts I and III.
3. See infra Part II.
4. DAI NIHON TEIKOKU K(13ƿ [MEIJI CONSTITUTION] (Japan) (the 
reference to “[t]he 11th day of the 2nd month of the 22nd year of Meiji” correlates 
to February 11, 1889, on the Roman Calendar). 
5. Id. arts. 22-30.
6. Id. arts. 25-30.
7. Id. art. 35. Article 35 made this right dependent on the election law, 
which limited who could vote to the wealthiest men until 1925 when the election 
laws were amended to allow all men to vote. Women’s suffrage did not occur until 
1945. See Aaron William Moore, Childhood, Education and Youth in Imperial 
Japan, 1925-1945: The Historical Setting, CHILDHOOD, EDUCATION AND YOUTH IN 
MODERN JAPAN, http://www.japanese-childhood.manchester.ac.uk/en/topics/history-
of-japan-1889-1845/ [https://perma.cc/L3CQ-W445] (last visited Mar. 18, 2017). 
8. DAI NIHON TEIKOKU K(13ƿ[MEIJI CONSTITUTION], art. 27 (Japan).
9. Id. art. 22.
10. Id. art. 25. 
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matters,11 and the right to freedom of speech.12 In reality, however, 
these rights were quite limited.13
Some have touted the fact that the Meiji Constitution contained 
a religious freedom clause as evidence that it protected religious 
freedom. This idea, however, is contradicted by a great deal of 
history, which demonstrates that non-conforming religious groups 
were persecuted.14 Even traditional local Shinto groups were 
impacted by the government’s establishment of State Shinto and 
laws that did not recognize local shrines and, in some cases, required 
shrines to merge or close.15
The religious freedom provision of the Meiji Constitution read:
Japanese subjects shall, within limits not prejudicial to peace and order, 
and not antagonistic to their duties as subjects, enjoy freedom of religious 
belief.16
Over time, the second and third clauses severely limited the 
fourth clause, which set forth the right to religious freedom and 
supported persecution of religions and religious leaders who did not 
show proper fealty to the Emperor.17 The root of this persecution 
arose from the advent and rise of State Shinto and absolute fealty to 
the Emperor.18
The Meiji Constitution had another clause relating to religion: 
“The Emperor is sacred and inviolable.”19 Thus, as a practical matter, 
the predicate language to the right to religious freedom, “Japanese 
subjects shall, within limits not prejudicial to peace and order, and 
not antagonistic to their duties as subjects,”20 included duties to the 
11. Id. art. 24.
12. Id. art. 29.
13. See Norikazu Kawagishi, The Birth of Judicial Review in Japan, 5 INT’L 
J. CONST. L. 308, 311, 321 (2007) (explaining that the Meiji Constitution never lived 
up to its potential of fostering liberal constitutionalism).
14. See JOSEPH M. KITAGAWA, RELIGION IN JAPANESE HISTORY 202-45 
(1990); see generally Tanaka Jiro, Religion and the State under the Meiji and the 
Present Constitutions, in RELIGION AND STATE IN JAPAN (Int’l Inst. for the Study of 
Religions ed., 1959).
15. See Morioka, supra note 1, at 535-37. People often quietly continued 
the local practices secretly. Id. at 537.
16. DAI NIHON TEIKOKU K(13ƿ [MEIJI CONSTITUTION], art. 28 (Japan).
17. See notes 13-15 and accompanying text.
18. See Kawagishi, supra note 13, at 311, 321; Morioka, supra note 1, at 
535-37. 
19. DAI NIHON TEIKOKU K(13ƿ [MEIJI CONSTITUTION], art. 3 (Japan).
20. Id. art. 28.
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“sacred and inviolable” Emperor.21 This was true of other rights as 
well.22
The Meiji Constitution, while including some secular values, 
was not in any true sense a secular constitution.23 Article 3 of the 
Meiji Constitution, and many of the practices condoned under it, 
provide adequate evidence of this conclusion. In fact, what has 
become known as State Shinto was born under the Meiji Restoration 
and supported by the Meiji Constitution.24 It was established as the 
state religion;25 although the government consistently tried to cast it 
as a form of political and ethical system rather than religion.26 At its 
height, State Shinto was used and manipulated by the military and 
the government to support war and persecution.27 It was also closely 
tied to the duties of Japanese citizens.28 The Home Ministry—
through a shifting set of bureaus and agencies—was responsible for 
promoting elements of State Shinto among the populace,29 and the 
military was later able to utilize this as a tool.30
State Shinto centered on the worship of, and public recognition 
of and fealty to, the Emperor and the imperial ancestors, who were 
said to have come from an unbroken line descended from the 
Goddess Amaterasu, the Goddess of the sun and universe in 
Shintoism.31 It is important not to confuse State Shinto with the
longstanding tradition of Shintoism in Japan. While State Shinto had 
21. Id. art. 3.
22. See, e.g., id. art. 31 (freedom of speech); id. (“The provisions contained 
in the present Chapter [Chapter II: Rights and Duties of Subjects] shall not affect the 
exercise of the powers appertaining to the Emperor, in times of war or in cases of a 
national emergency.”)
23. See Morioka, supra note 1, at 535; Frank S. Ravitch, The Shinto Cases: 
Religion, Culture, or Both—The Japanese Supreme Court and Establishment of 
Religion Jurisprudence, 2013 BYU L. REV. 505, 506-07 (2013).
24. See Keiko Yamagishi, Freedom of Religion, Religious Political 
Participation, and Separation of Religion and State: Legal Considerations from 
Japan, 2008 BYU L. REV. 919, 928 (2008).
25. See id. at 925-28. Cf. Morioka, supra note 1, at 535-37 (noting that the 
Meiji era, government attempted to obfuscate the religious nature of State Shinto by 
casting it as an ethical and nationalist system).
26. See Morioka, supra note 1, at 535-37. 
27. See Kawagishi, supra note 13, at 315-16, 321-22; Ravitch, supra note 
23, at 507-08; Frank S. Ravitch, The Japanese Prime Minister’s Visits to the 
Yasukuni Shrine Analyzed Under Articles 20 and 89 of the Japanese Constitution,
22 MICH. ST. INT’L L. REV. 713, 716-18 (2014).
28. See HOZUMI, supra note 1, at 57-59; Morioka, supra note 1, at 534-38.
29. See Morioka, supra note 1, at 525-36. 
30. See C. SCOTT LITTLETON, UNDERSTANDING SHINTO 8-9 (2002).
31. See HOZUMI, supra note 1, at 15. 
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a central focus on the Emperor and his ancestors, traditional Shinto is 
heavily focused on household and local ancestors, and to some 
extent, broader spirits and animism.32 This does not mean that 
traditional Shintoism has no focus on national or imperial ancestors, 
but rather that imperial ancestors and nationalism are not central to 
most Shinto traditions.33 In fact, the non-recognition and pressure 
placed on many local shrines under the State Shinto system was an 
important problem for religious freedom.34 Moreover, as Shinto 
scholars have noted, State Shinto—and the government’s promotion 
of it as an ethical and nationalist institution—placed significant 
pressure on the traditional view of ancestor Kami and local Kami 
(spirits) and ultimately led to a significant decrease in the following 
of traditional Shinto.35
In State Shinto, the Emperor and nationalism were the core of 
everything.36 State Shinto included public rituals at the Imperial 
House and required shrines to the Emperor’s ancestors in every 
home.37 The Imperial Household gave items to every household in 
Japan every year from the Imperial Shrine at Ise.38 It was considered 
to be the duty of every loyal Japanese subject, often including 
mandatory attendance by schoolchildren, to attend the public rituals 
held in their areas.39 This is hardly an environment in which free 
exercise of religion was easily maintained. Buddhism, which had in 
earlier periods of Japanese history sometimes been favored by the 
state, became somewhat disfavored as State Shinto gained 
ascendancy.40
Ultimately, State Shinto facilitated a nationalist frenzy 
accompanied by what has sometimes been called a national cult of 
Emperor worship.41 This helped foster a militant mentality and a 
greater sense of Japanese superiority,42 which in turn led to 
32. See LITTLETON, supra note 30, at 23.
33. See id. at 23, 47.
34. See Morioka, supra note 1, at 535-37.
35. Id. at 536.
36. See id. at 535-37; Ravitch, supra note 23, at 506-07; LITTLETON, supra 
note 32, at 8-9.
37. HOZUMI, supra note 1, at 30, 37-39, 84-85, 95-105.
38. Id. at 30. The Ise Shrine is the most important shrine involving the 
Imperial Family in the Shinto Tradition. 
39. Id. at 108, 112-13.
40. Id. at 91.
41. Helen Hardacre, 6KLQWǀ DQG WKH 6WDWH -1988, in STUDIES IN 
CHURCH AND STATE 32 (John F. Wilson ed., 1989). 
42. Id. at 40.
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increasing military aggressiveness and territorial occupation during 
the Meiji, Taisho, and Showa eras.43
So what does all of this have to do with the question at hand, 
namely, is secularism necessary for liberal constitutionalism? The 
Meiji Constitution in practice was not what most people would 
consider an example of liberal constitutionalism, but it aspired to be 
so, at least within the era when it was written. The language of the 
Meiji Constitution gives individuals protections that did not exist as 
a matter of constitutional right before it was promulgated.44 Indeed, it 
gave a modicum of protection for individual rights and expression.45
Yet, its promotion of a quasi-religious nationalism based in 
State Shinto undermined these individual freedoms in practice.46 It 
could have theoretically gone the other way. It could have been that 
people enjoyed all the individual freedoms so long as they did not try 
to prevent others from viewing the Emperor as sacred and inviolate. 
But, of course, that is not how it played out, and the sacredness of, 
and fealty to, the Emperor impeded individual freedoms in many 
ways.47 The Meiji Constitution is an example of how a religiously 
affected constitutional system might make liberal constitutionalism 
less likely to succeed. This is especially so when the Meiji 
Constitution is compared to the modern Japanese Constitution, which 
is secular and yet has been quite effective at promoting religious 
freedom, among other rights.
II. THE MODERN JAPANESE CONSTITUTION, SECULARISM, AND 
LIBERAL DEMOCRACY
The modern Japanese Constitution was imposed on Japan by 
the United States occupying authorities after World War II.48 It was 
promulgated in November 1946 and became enforceable on May 3, 
43. See id. DW  .ǀVDNX <RVKLQR ‘Resurgent Cultural Nationalism’ and 
‘Prudent Revivalist Nationalism’, in 5 NATIONALISM: CRITICAL CONCEPTS IN 
POLITICAL SCIENCE 1885 (John Hutchinson & Anthony D. Smith eds., 2001); 
Tokihisa Sumimoto, Religious Freedom Problems in Japan: Background and 
Current Prospects, 5 INT’L J. PEACE STUD. 77, 77-86 (2000).
44. DAI NIHON TEIKOKU K(13ƿ[MEIJI CONSTITUTION], arts. 22-30 (Japan).
45. Id.
46. See supra notes 15, 27, 43 and accompanying text.
47. See, e.g., Morioka, supra note 1, at 535-37 (impeding traditional Shinto 
at the local level); KITAGAWA, supra note 14, at 202-45 (limitations on religious 
freedom and other freedoms); Jiro, supra note 14 (same); Ravitch, supra note 23, at 
505-08 (same).
48. Ravitch, supra note 23, at 508.
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1947.49 Even though it was imposed on Japan by the United States, it 
has become central to the modern Japanese state and its people.50 In 
fact, as the Saiko-saiban-sho (Japanese Supreme Court) has 
recognized, over time the Japanese people and courts have adapted 
the modern Japanese Constitution to better fit Japanese culture and 
traditions.51
The modern Japanese Constitution is secular. In fact, one of the 
purposes of the religion clauses in the Constitution,52 as well as the 
clauses related to the Emperor,53 was to diminish the government’s 
ability to impose and foster State Shinto.54 This movement began 
with the Potsdam Declaration even before the modern constitution 
was promulgated.55 In this way, the modern Japanese Constitution 
stands in stark contrast to the Meiji Constitution.
Yet, both the modern Japanese Constitution and the Meiji 
Constitution, on their face, are designed to promote a great deal of 
personal freedom.56 The difference lies, in part, in the way in which 
the Meiji Constitution placed fealty to the Emperor, who was sacred 
and inviolate, above all personal rights.57 As explained in Part I, this 
led to the promotion of State Shinto and strong practical limitations 
on many of the personal freedoms the Meiji Constitution sought to 
protect. In contrast, the modern Japanese Constitution protects a 
variety of freedoms, including religious freedom, from a secular 
vantage that does not hold any religion as superior to others.58 These 
freedoms are of course not perfectly effectuated under the modern 
Japanese Constitution, and there are areas where seemingly strong 
constitutional rights have been limited through judicial interpretation 
and cultural practices, but that is true in many constitutional systems.
In order to understand the secular nature of the modern 
Japanese Constitution, it is helpful to understand the ways in which 
49. NIHONKOKU K(13ƿ[K(13ƿ] [CONSTITUTION] (Japan).
50. The Ehime Tamagushi Case6DLNǀ6DLEDQVKR>6XSCt.] Apr. 2, 1997, 
1992 (Gyo-Tsu) no. 156, 51 S$,.ƿSAIBANSHO MINJI H$15(,6+ǋ [M,16+ǋ] 1673 
(Japan).
51. Id.; Ravitch, supra note 23, at 508.
52. NIHONKOKU K(13ƿ[K(13ƿ] [CONSTITUTION], arts. 20, 89 (Japan).
53. Id. arts. 1-8.
54. See Morioka, supra note 1, at 542-43; Kawagishi, supra note 13, at 308-
09; The Ehime Tamagushi Case, supra note 50.
55. Potsdam Declaration, Proclamation Defining Terms for Japanese 
Surrender, issued at Potsdam, July 26, 1945; see, e.g., Morioka, supra note 1, at 542.
56. See supra Part I; supra notes 47-53 and accompanying text.
57. See supra Part I.
58. See supra Part I.
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the constitution treats the relationship between government and 
religion. This is set forth primarily in two clauses. The religion 
clauses of the Japanese Constitution can be found in Articles 20 and 
89. Article 20 reads:
Freedom of religion is guaranteed to all. No religious organization shall 
receive any privileges from the State, nor exercise any political authority.
No person shall be compelled to take part in any religious act, celebration, 
rite or practice. The State and its organs shall refrain from religious 
education or any other religious activity.59
Article 89 reads:
No public money or other property shall be expended or appropriated for 
the use, benefit or maintenance of any religious institution or association, 
or for any charitable, educational or benevolent enterprises not under the 
control of public authority.60
In a series of cases, these clauses have been interpreted to 
create a separation of politics and religion (seiji to shuukyou no 
bunri).61 These cases can be broadly (and over-simplistically) 
classified into two categories: (1) Cases that set forth the importance 
of the separation of politics and religion, but found that the particular 
practice in question would be understood by the average Japanese 
citizen as a cultural practice, even if it has religious dimensions, 
rather than an advancement of religion;62 and (2) Cases that also 
assert the importance of the separation of politics and religion and 
found that the government practice in question violates that principle 
by advancing religion in a manner that would be understood as 
advancing religion by the average Japanese citizen.63
The Japanese Supreme Court has interpreted Article 20 as 
providing stronger protection for religious freedom than under the 
U.S. Constitution.64 In the latter context, there is some interesting 
debate over whether the decision protecting religious 
accommodations was really a case under Article 20 or whether it was 
59. NIHONKOKU K(13ƿ[K(13ƿ] [CONSTITUTION], art. 20 (Japan).
60. Id. art. 89.
61. See Ravitch, supra note 23, at 508-14. 
62. Id. at 510-12.
63. Id. at 513-20.
64. See, e.g., 0DWVXPRWRY.RED\DVKL6DLNǀ6DLEDQVKR>6XS&W@0DU
1996, 1995 (Gyo-Tsu) no. 74, 50 S$,.ƿSAIBANSHO MINJI H$15(,6+ǋ[M,16+ǋ] 469 
(Japan) (Petty Bench) (also known as the Kobe Technical Case); Frank S. Ravitch, 
Symposium, The Unbearable Lightness of Free Exercise Under Smith: Exemptions, 
Dasein, and the More Nuanced Approach of the Japanese Supreme Court, 44 TEX.
TECH. L. REV. 259, 275-76 (2011).
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more a statutory case, but that debate is beyond the scope of this 
Article. For what it is worth, there was a statutory element to the 
case, but I agree with those who think the decision also relied on 
Article 20. 
Finally, the Shuukyou Hojin Ho (Religious Juridical Persons 
Act) has been upheld as consistent with the Japanese Constitution.65
That Act provides a number of benefits, including tax breaks, to 
religious entities that register as a religious juridical person under the 
Act.66 The Act makes clear even those groups that do not register as 
Religious Juridical Persons have the full free exercise of religion 
granted under the Constitution and laws of Japan.67 The Act has been 
criticized after it was amended following the Sarin Gas attacks by 
Aum Shinrikyo to require a minimal amount of government 
oversight, but compared to many laws in Western Europe, the 
oversight is minor and only arises in limited circumstances.68
The cases supporting the concept of separation of politics and 
religion demonstrate that the modern Japanese Constitution is secular 
both on its face and as interpreted. This is, of course, consistent with 
Japanese society as well. Japanese society is mostly secular, and 
while many Japanese identify with Shinto and/or Buddhist traditions, 
this is mostly in a cultural context.69 That is, people experience 
religious traditions, such as visiting shrines on certain dates, as more 
of a cultural practice than a religious one.70 Of course, there is no 
exact dividing point between culture and religion, but suffice it to 
say that there is no great cry from the majority of people in Japan for 
a non-secular constitution. A secular constitution fits twenty-first 
century Japan well.
Make no mistake, a secular constitution—any secular 
constitution—is not a guarantee of unlimited personal freedom. 
Whether under the U.S. Constitution, the modern Japanese 
65. Shuukyou Hojin Ho [Religious Juridical Persons Act] (as amended 
1951, amended in 1995) (Japan).
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. See International Religious Freedom Report 2002: Japan, BUREAU OF 
DEMOCRACY, HUM. RTS., & LAB., https://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/irf/2002/13874.htm 
[https://perma.cc/QHV4-KP8Q] (last visited Feb. 22, 2017).
69. Sumimoto, supra note 43, at 81 (“Although the image of Japan abroad 
is one of a country filled with picturesque temples, the truth is that the Japanese are 
among the least religious of nations. A poll reported in the Daily Yomiuri, 3 July 
1994, indicated that only one out of four Japanese claim to follow a particular 
religion, and over 70 percent do not believe in any religion.”).
70. See id.
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Constitution, or others, courts have restricted personal freedom more 
than the language of the constitution requires and sometimes the 
language itself restricts certain freedoms.71 Just because a 
constitution reflects liberal constitutional values does not mean it 
will lead to optimal protection of those values; if there is even a 
means for determining what optimal protection would look like.
Under the modern Japanese Constitution, free speech is the 
area where perhaps the greatest restrictions have arisen.72 On its face, 
the Japanese Constitution offers strong protection for free speech 
rights,73 and in many ways this is reflected in practice. Yet, in several 
cases the Saiko-saiban-sho (Japanese Supreme Court) has upheld 
limitations on freedom of speech and the freedom not to speak, 
which would not be likely under other liberal constitutional 
systems.74 Significantly, however, the Japanese Constitution has 
provided greater protection than most other constitutions for some 
freedoms, such as the freedom of religion.75
While one can certainly disagree with the Japanese Supreme 
Court’s interpretations of free speech rights and other rights, there is 
little question that the modern secular Japanese Constitution is far 
more protective of rights than its predecessor. The Meiji Constitution 
was an abject failure in protecting most personal freedoms, including 
those it protected on its face. The modern Japanese Constitution has 
sometimes failed to live up to idealistic protections of personal 
autonomy, just as the U.S. Constitution and many others have failed 
to live up to idealistic protections of personal autonomy, but it has 
succeeded in creating and fostering personal freedom even in a 
nation where group dynamics are exceptionally important.
Some of what may be viewed as failures of the Japanese 
constitutional system in protecting rights may arise from a significant 
cultural difference between Japan and the West, namely, the concept 
71. See Case to Seek Revocation of the Admonition6DLNǀ6DLEDQVKR>6XS
Ct.] June 14, 2011, 2010 (Gyo-Tsu) 314 no. 65, 4 S$,.ƿ SAIBANSHO MINJI 
H$15(,6+ǋ[M,16+ǋ] (Japan) (Petty Bench) (upholding punishment of teachers for 
failure to stand and face the flag during the national anthem, but requiring that the 
punishment not be excessive); see also X v. Tokyo Kyikuiinkai, 6DLNǀ6DLEDQVKR
[Sup. Ct.] Feb. 27, 2007 (Gyo-Tsu) 328, no. 61, 1 S$,.ƿ SAIBANSHO MINJI 
H$15(,6+ǋ[M,16+ǋ] 291 (Japan) (school teacher forced to play piano for national 
anthem); Dan Rosen, Policing Political Speech: Japan’s Mistrust of the 
Marketplace, 22 MICH. ST. INT’L L. REV. 799, 800-01 (2014) (political speech).
72. See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
73. See NIHONKOKU K(13ƿ[K(13ƿ] [CONSTITUTION], arts. 19, 21 (Japan).
74. See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
75. See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
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of Wa in Japanese culture.76 Wa is a term usually translated as 
“harmony,”77 but it reflects a much broader social structure of group 
dynamics and conflict avoidance that is central to Japanese society 
and often misunderstood by people from other cultures.78 The 
“group,” whether friends, company, family, or others plays a central 
part in Japanese culture.79 As a result, the western concept of 
personal autonomy does not always fit well in Japanese society.80
Despite the prominence of Wa, some Japanese court decisions 
protecting individual freedoms, even against group dynamics and 
rules, have been issued under the modern Japanese Constitution.81 I
raise this to point out that while Japanese culture may affect the way 
in which the Japanese Constitution is interpreted—which one would 
hope is the case—the fact that Japanese culture has a strong group 
identity has not taken the Japanese Constitution out of the category 
of constitutions promoting a concept of liberal constitutionalism.
III. SECULARISM AND LIBERAL CONSTITUTIONALISM WRIT LARGE
How does the Japanese experience help us understand whether 
secularism is a necessary predicate for liberal constitutionalism on a 
broader scale? Japan is one of the few countries that had a 
constitution espousing individual rights and freedom but maintaining 
and promoting a dominant religion that was immediately followed by 
a secular constitution espousing individual rights and freedoms. Of 
course, Japan is quite different from many other countries, but the 
Japanese constitutional experience suggests, at the very least, that 
secularism is helpful in promoting the autonomy and personal 
freedom that is so central to concepts of liberal constitutionalism. 
Consider the following. Both the Meiji Constitution and the 
modern Japanese Constitution espoused religious freedom rights and 
free speech rights.82 Under the Meiji Constitution, these rights were 
overwhelmed by principles of fealty to the Emperor and State Shinto. 
76. See Frank S. Ravitch, The Continued Relevance of Philosophical 
Hermeneutics in Legal Thought, in THE NATURE OF LEGAL INTERPRETATION (Brian 
Slocum ed., Univ. of Chicago Press, forthcoming 2017) (explaining how Westerners 
often miss important aspects of Japanese legal aspects due to underestimating or 





81. See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
82. See supra Parts I-II.
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Dissenters were persecuted, and speech and religious freedom was 
significantly limited when those freedoms conflicted with the 
established order and State Shinto.83
At first glance, one might argue that this was because of 
Japanese group culture combined with the militarism of the era, 
rather than being caused by religion. This, however, overlooks two 
salient points. First, group dynamics and harmony are still core to 
Japanese culture, and yet today dissenting religions are protected,84
there is a modicum of free speech,85 and people are not generally 
punished by government for dissent; although dissent may hurt their 
status within certain social groups.
Second, the militarism of the Meiji era cannot be neatly 
separated from the doctrine of State Shinto.86 Militarism and a sense 
of cultural superiority were fostered by State Shinto, and State Shinto 
was favored by the military to maintain its power.87 The Emperor 
was constitutionally sacred and inviolable88 and, as a practical 
matter, a living religious icon.89 Therefore, it is not that the values of 
individual autonomy and freedom were excluded from the Meiji 
Constitution, but rather that the constitutional fostering of State 
Shinto informed the cultural, legal, and social structures of that era in 
such a way as to allow the promised freedoms to become illusory for 
most people who did not conform to the dominant norm. Of course, 
the era in which a constitution arises affects that constitution, but the 
roots of liberal constitutionalism from which the Meiji Constitution, 
in part, borrowed existed before the Meiji Constitution.90 The failure 
of liberal constitutional values cannot be attributed solely to State 
83. See supra Part I.
84. See Matsumoto v. Kobayashi6DLNǀ6DLEDQVKR>6XS&W@0DU
1995 (Gyo-Tsu) no. 74, 50 S$,.ƿ SAIBANSHO MINJI H$15(,6+ǋ [M,16+ǋ] 469 
(Japan) (Petty Bench); see also Ravitch, supra note 76.
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Shinto, but there is no doubt that government support for, and 
promotion of, State Shinto played an important role in that failure.91
Times have changed, and today established state religions may 
not lead to murder and warfare in a constitutional democracy. Yet, 
the dynamic of the government preferred religion leading to 
persecution and limitation of rights for those who are not part of, or 
beholden too, the preferred religion is all too real. We have seen the 
principles of liberal democracy and personal freedom violently 
crushed on occasion even in the United States when local 
governments have violated the secular norms of the U.S. 
Constitution and tried to enforce a preferred religion.92 The violence 
and persecution fostered by state religious preference under the Meiji 
Constitution may have been more extreme than what we often see 
today, but that is a question of degree of harm rather than a question 
of whether constitutional religious preferences foster limitations on 
liberal constitutionalism in the first place.
CONCLUSION
The era of constitutionalism in Japan began with a lot of 
promise. The Meiji Constitution on its face granted a number of 
personal freedoms. That constitution, however, was not secular, and 
partly as a result of the State Shinto it fostered, it never lived up to its 
promise of granting individual rights and freedoms. 
Conversely, the modern Japanese Constitution has fostered a 
great deal of individual and religious freedoms. It is clearly a secular 
constitution, and while imposed by the United States, it has been 
embraced and transformed by the Japanese courts and people. It is 
not perfect, nor is any constitution. At times, certain rights have been 
interpreted more narrowly than some would like, but in the end it is a 
good example of liberal constitutionalism. The relationship and 
comparison between the Meiji Constitution and the modern Japanese 
Constitution demonstrate that secularism, while perhaps not a 
necessary predicate to liberal constitutionalism, is far more likely to 
bring about stronger personal and religious freedom for all citizens.
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